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In 2008, the citizens of California voted in favor of Proposition 2, which bans the use of cages for housing egg-laying chickens. Similar propositions 
in Arizona (Proposition 204 in November, 2006) and other states mandate stall-free and crate-free housing for sows and calves for veal, 
respectively. Media advertising is used heavily in state-level propositions because of the narrow focus of the issue, the geographic concentration of 
likely voters and the (typically) highly polarized nature of the campaigns. There is evident support for this issue among some consumers as cage-
free eggs sell for a significant premium in retail stores (sometimes $1.75 per dozen or more). What is less clear, however, is whether voting in 
initiatives similar to Proposition 2 is driven by advertising-inspired mass-support of the issue at hand, or whether it is highly motivated support by a 
small segment of the population that cannot be influenced by advertising. In this study, we examine the role of media advertising in the initiative 
process using an experimental analysis of ads used by both supporting and opposing sides for Proposition 2 in California in November 2008.
Contribution
(1) Develop a new method of estimating the effect of marketing activities in voter behavior in public referenda. (2) The econometric model provides 
a way of separating the hype content of advertising from its informative content. In doing so, we also offer a new explanation for the observed 
asymmetric effects of positive and negative information on consumers' preferences. (3) Propose and apply a metric against which policies may be 
judged as being either for or against the public interest. 
Objectives
(1) Determine the willingness-to-pay for food products raised in a "humane" way, or one that is fundamentally different from current practice.  (2)
Determine the relative effect on WTP of media advertising presented either in support of an animal welfare initiative, or counter to it.  (3) Determine 
whether media advertising shifts or rotates the demand curve, and the welfare implications of whether the dominant effect is a shift or a rotation. 
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Empirical Model of Media Advertising
• We test for shift or rotation effects of media advertising using an 
empirical model that captures the theoretical effects of 
advertising described by Johnson and Myatt (2006).
• Advertising operates on the dispersion of consumer valuations 
for the product.
• If advertising provides "real information," then consumers 
who value the product relatively highly before the 
advertisement will like it even more after the ad, and those 
who value it less highly will like it even less. 
• Dispersion of valuations widens and demand rotates 
clockwise.
• The analogy to political ads is straightforward: Polarizing issues 
that tend to have both passionate supporters and equally 
passionate detractors are "highly differentiated products," while 
more mundane issues that are not likely to inspire as much 
controversy are more akin to "homogeneous products.“
• The marginal voter in a polarizing campaign is likely to have a 
valuation greater than the mean, so ads that provide real 
information are likely to increase the dispersion of demand, 
rotate the demand curve clockwise, increase the valuation of the 
marginal voter, and raise the "total take" on voting day. 
• On the other hand, real information in a run-of-the-mill 
campaign is expected to reduce the dispersion of demand, 
essentially moving voters to the center of the issue, rotating 
the demand curve counter-clockwise, and increasing the 
willingness-to-pay of the marginal voter who began with a 





• Relative to control, the "Pro" parameter implies a WTP increase of about $0.25 / dozen. 
• The "Anti" parameter indicates that ads in favor of the status quo, led participants to bid $0.07 / dozen less than control.
• Combining both types of information, however, we find that participants are willing to pay nearly as much as if they only 
saw the "Pro" ads -- $0.21 / dozen more than control.
• The "Pro" ads contain nearly three times the real information as "Anti" ads .
• "Pro" ads cause the willingness to pay to rise significantly.
• The "Anti" ads cause the willingness to pay to fall only marginally.
• Real information in this case is apparently worth only $5.67 on an annualized basis, while the hype value of advertising is 
worth some 93.7% of the total, or $83.82 per household per year.
Experimental Design
To determine the willingness-to-pay for cage-free 
eggs, we use a Becker-deGroot-Marschak (1964, 
BDM) auction mechanism in which we offer 
subjects the opportunity to purchase eggs that 
are clearly labeled as cage-free.
Experiment Procedure:
1. We informed each participant that their 
information would be kept strictly confidential and 
their participation in the experiment was 
completely voluntary. 
2. Described the animal welfare issue and how it 
relates to the way in which eggs are produced on 
farms. 
3. Participants were then asked not to communicate 
with one another.
4. Participants were introduced to the auction. The 
mechanics of the BDM procedure were carefully 
explained to the subjects, including the fact that it 
is incentive compatible.
5. Subjects were provided an initial endowment of 
$45.00, a regular-size chocolate bar and a dozen 
regular (non-cage-free) eggs.
6. Did a simple example auction involving candy 
bars that demonstrated how the BDM 
mechanism works.
7. The sample was divided into ten groups of fifteen 
participants each: 
• 2 groups bid on cage-free eggs with only prior 
information regarding the existence of 
Proposition 2 (the control group); 
• 3 groups bid after being shown a short media 
clip from a popular television show in which 
we had embedded ads developed in support 
of Proposition 2 (pro-cage-free legislation), 
• 3 groups bid after being shown ads against 
Proposition 2 (anti-cage-free legislation) and 
• 2 groups bid after being shown both sets of 
ads. 
8. Demographic questions were filled out.
Mean of Rand. Param. Std. Dev. of Rand. Param.
Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Constant 0.341* 3.086 0.533* 48.638
Pro 0.253* 7.525 0.352* 16.805
Anti -0.070* -2.158 0.132* 7.901
Pro / Anti 0.211* 5.626 0.416* 15.763
Note: A single asterisk indicates significance at a 5% level. Tests of spatial lag parameter determine 
preference for or aversion to differentiation.
Mean Std. Dev.
Base Utility 0.799 0.659
Shift Effect 0.885 0.679
Rotation Effect 0.905 0.862
Shift Effect per Dozen (cents) 27.781 46.464
Rotation Effect per Dozen (cents) 1.881 87.240
Total Effect per Dozen  (cents) 29.663 99.616
Annual Shift Effect ($) 83.822 14.019
Annual Rotation Effect ($) 5.677 26.321
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Data Summary
• The ads in general reduce consumer welfare because the 
mass of consumers lower their WTP as a result of the ads.
Conclusions
• The "hype" or shift effect dominates the rotation effect for each 
type of ad.
• The ability of the ads supporting Proposition 2 were 
sufficiently effective in changing preferences to outweigh 
the negative effects associated with the opposing ads.
• The real information content of the ads was not 
inconsequential. 
• Over 6% of the change in consumer welfare associated 
with the ads came from the real information effect as 
opposed to the hype effect. 
Therefore, the ads both changed preferences and managed to 
harden some voters' opinions on either side.
Welfare Effects of Cage-Free Egg Advertising